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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under § 78A-3-
102(3)(k) U.C.A. and has transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
§ 78A-3-102(4) U.C.A. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to § 78A-4-103Q) U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
I. Issue: When §16-10a-740(4)(a) provides that a derivative action 
shall be dismissed on motion by the corporation, if it is determined in good faith after a 
reasonable inquiry, by the person so specified, that the maintenance of the derivative 
proceeding is not in the best interest of the corporation; does the trial court still have full 
discretion to substitute its own business judgment for the person so specified, and deny 
the motion to dismiss? If so, why was the term "shall" used in the Statute? 
Standard of Review: The interpretation and application of a statute 
is reviewed for correctness; with no deference given to the trial court. Summit Water 
Distrib. Co. v. Mountain Reg'l Water Special Serv. Dist., 108 P.3d 119 (Ut.App. 2005); 
Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 94 P.3d 234 (Utah 2004); Sindt v. Retirement Bd, 
157 P.3d 797 (Utah 2007). The standard of review on a motion to dismiss a derivative 
action brought by a corporation is de novo. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876 
(Minn. 2003); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 2000); In re PSE & GS'holder 
Litig., 801 A.2d295, 313 (2002). 
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Preservation for Review: The interpretation and application of 
§16-10a-740(4)(a) was raised in the trial court on the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss 
filed pursuant to §16-10a-740(4)(a) based on the determination of R. Brad Townsend, the 
independent person specified under §16-10a-740(4)(f); who concluded after his 
investigation that the maintenance of the derivative claims in this case, was not in the best 
interest of the Corporation. (Rec. 1023-1075) 
II. Issue: Does the trial court's inquiry under §16-10a-740(4)(a) as to 
whether a reasonable and good faith inquiry was made, include the right to evaluate and 
weigh the factors considered by the person so specified; e.g. questioning in hind-sight 
whether the Corporation did all it could do, under the circumstances, to raise the full 
$200,000.00 needed to fund the airport project? 
Standard of Review: The interpretation and application of a statute 
is reviewed for correctness; with no deference given to the trial court. Summit Water 
Distrib. Co. v. Mountain Reg'! Water Special Serv. DisL, 108 P.3d 119 (Ut.App. 2005); 
Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 94 P.3d 234 (Utah 2004); Sindtv. Retirement Bd., 
157 P.3d 797 (Utah 2007). The standard of review on a motion to dismiss a derivative 
action brought by a corporation is de novo. Jans sen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876 
(Minn. 2003); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 2000); In re PSE & GS'holder 
Litig., 801 A.2d295, 313 (2002). 
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Preservation for Review: The interpretation and application of 
§16-10a-740(4)(a) was raised in the trial court on the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss 
filed pursuant to §16-10a-740(4)(a) based on the determination of R. Brad Townsend, the 
independent person specified under §16-10a-740(4)(f), who concluded that the 
maintenance of the derivative claims in this case, was not in the best interest of the 
Corporation. (Rec. 1023-1075). 
III. Issue: If the independent person specified under §16-10a-740(4)(f) 
determines that the Defendants acted with sound business judgment, i.e., within the 
"business judgment rule;" and concludes that the Corporation should not proceed with the 
derivative claims against them; can the court still require the Corporation to proceed with 
the derivative claims? Doesn't this disregard the mandate in §16-10a-740(4)(a) that the 
court shall dismiss the derivative proceeding? 
Standard of Review: The interpretation and application of a statute 
is reviewed for correctness; with no deference given to the trial court. Summit Water 
Distrib. Co. v. Mountain Reg'l Water Special Serv. DisL, 108 P.3d 119 (Ut.App. 2005); 
Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 94 P.3d 234 (Utah 2004); Sindt v. Retirement Bd., 
157 P.3d 797 (Utah 2007). The standard of review on a motion to dismiss a derivative 
action brought by a corporation is de novo. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876 
(Minn. 2003); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 2000); In re PSE & G S'holder 
Litig., 801 A.2d 295, 313 (2002). 
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Preservation for Review: The interpretation and application of 
§16-10a-740(4)(a) was raised in the trial court on the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss 
filed pursuant to §16-10a-740(4)(a) based on the determination of R. Brad Townsend, the 
independent person specified under §16-10a-740(4)(f), who concluded that the 
maintenance of the derivative claims in this case, was not in the best interest of the 
Corporation. (Rec. 1023-1075). 
STATUTE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
The determinative statute in this case is §16-10a-740(4)(a) which provides: 
§ 16-10a-740(4)(a). 
(4)(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by 
the corporation if a person or group specified in Subsections (4)(b) or (4)(f) 
determines in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its 
conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in 
the best interest of the corporation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case, Course of Proceeding and Disposition in Trial Court: 
The Corporation, Millcreek Coffee Roasters ("Corporation") is in the 
business of wholesale coffee, imports, roasting and sales. Its main location is 657 South 
Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Plaintiff, Dana Brewster, ("Dana") her ex-
husband, D. Steven Brewster ("Steven") and their 3 children (Steven, Stacey and Tiffany) 
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are shareholders in the Corporation.1 Dana and Steven divorced in 1996, and Steven has 
been managing the Corporation since this time. (Rec. 98, ^ js 9 & 10; Rec. 1187-1188). 
The Defendant, Gary B. Brewster, is Steven's brother, and was a director in 
Millcreek Coffee Roasters during the relevant time. The Defendant, Millcreek Coffee 
Airport LLC, is a Utah limited liability company formed in 2006, to take advantage of a 
unique retail opportunity that become available at the Salt Lake International Airport. 
(Rec. 1073, lj 12). Collectively hereafter the "Brewster Defendants". 
At the end of 2005, a unique opportunity became available to open a retail 
outlet at the Salt Lake International Airport, with Host International. (Rec. 98, ^J11). 
Time was of the essence and the opportunity would be lost if the parties did not act 
promptly. (Rec. 1033, 1073, Tf 9) In January of 2006 Steven told Dana of this opportunity 
and that $200,000.00 would be required to fund the project. (Rec. 1033, Tfs 5-10; Rec. 
1073, TJ10). The fact that Dana was told of this opportunity in January of 2006 is 
undisputed. (Rec. 1188-1190). To be equal partners in the project, each agreed to 
personally invest half or $100,000.00 each to fund the project. (Rec. 537, fs 30-31; Rec. 
1033, Tfs 9-10). This is also undisputed by Dana. (Rec. 1188-1190). A separate entity, 
Millcreek Coffee Airport LLC, was formed to operate the new venture. (Rec. 98, j^s 11-
14; Rec. 1073, ^ j 12). This is commonly how the Corporation took on new projects to 
^ n January 1, 2006 each child received 2% for a total of 6%, the remaining 94% is 
shared by Dana and D. Steven Brewster, each with 47%. 
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protect the core business from the high amount of risk associated with a new venture, and 
to prevent the Corporation from having to go into debt, which would greatly reduce the 
high amount of profits paid to its shareholders. (Rec. 1073, ^ f 9; Rec. 1054, f^ 4). 
Steven invested his $100,000.00 to start the project, but Dana contrary to 
her initial promise did not invest her $100,000.00 for the project. (Rec. 1073, f 13). This 
is undisputed by Dana. (Rec. 1191). Thus, $100,000.00 was needed to complete the 
project. As a result, Steven used the Corporation's cash reserves (accumulated over a ten 
year period) to pay the remaining $100,000.00; and the Corporation became a 50% owner 
in the airport project. (Rec. 1034, ^ 12; Rec. 1073, ^  13). 
Dana Brewster filed this derivative action claiming that Steven and the 
other Brewster Defendants misappropriated a corporate opportunity in funding the airport 
project. (Rec. 530-567; Rec. 1191). Dana does not dispute that the airport venture was a 
good investment and has been profitable, but rather complains that the Corporation is 
only a 50% owner in the operation (making her a 23.5% owner) rather than a 100% owner 
(which would make her a 47% owner). (Rec. 541, f^ 43; Rec. 553, ^ f 130) Dana claims she 
should be a 47% owner in the airport operation, although she earlier refused to invest 
$100,000.00 with Steven to be a 50% owner in the operation. (Rec. 553 ^ 130; Rec. 1191) 
Dana disregards the fact that Steven did personally invest $100,000.00 in the airport 
project at the time; and that the Corporation did not have $200,000.00 to invest at the 
time. (Rec. 1048-1051; Rec. 1073, Tf 8). 
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Dana asserts in hind-sight that the Corporation could have taken out a loan 
to obtain the $200,000.00 necessary; however, servicing this debt would reduce the 
profits of the Corporation and a loan for this amount to such a small family business, 
would have required the financial backing and personal guarantees of both Dana and 
Steven as principals. (Rec. 1055, f 8). 
In this action, Margaret H. Olson of Hobbs & Olson, was appointed counsel 
for the Corporation. She proceeded under the statute governing derivative actions and 
retained a forensic accountant, R. Brad Townsend, to conduct an independent inquiry 
under §16-10a-740(4)(a), to determine if the maintenance of the derivative action in this 
case, was in the best interests of the Corporation. (Rec. 1023-1075) Steve and Dana 
stipulated to use Mr. Townsend as the person specified to conduct the inquiry under §16-
10a-740(4)(a). (Rec. 1024; ^  3; Rec. 1034, Tf 15; Rec. 1045; Rec. 1074, ^ 16). The 
appointment of Mr. Townsend for this purpose, and the waiver of any objections to his 
appointment, was agreed to and is undisputed by Dana. (Rec. 1191). 
Mr. Townsend conducted an in depth analysis as to whether the 
maintenance of the derivative action was in the best interest of the Corporation. To do 
this he analyzed all the books and records of the Corporation, including documentation 
provided by both parties, as well as, documents he specifically requested. He provided a 
log of the documents he reviewed as an attachment to his report dated July 7, 2008. (Rec. 
1065). Mr. Townsend also interviewed Steven and Dana Brewster, Dana's legal counsel, 
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and bank representatives. Mr. Townsend and his staff spent over 80 hours preparing his 
report. (Rec. 1024 & 1028). 
Mr. Townsend determined that the structure used by Steven of retaining the 
core business of the Corporation essentially debt free and developing this new business 
opportunity through a separate entity is consistent with the operation historically 
employed by the Corporation and is a practice commonly employed in the business 
community. (Rec. 1054, f^s 4 & 5). Mr. Townsend further opines that Steven used sound 
business judgment in structuring and funding the airport operation. (Rec. 1054, f^ 5). Mr. 
Townsend further verified that for the Corporation to borrow the money necessary to fund 
the airport project the personal guarantees of both Dana and Steven, as owners would be 
required; and the Corporation could not force them to provide these. (Rec. 1055, Tf 8) 
Mr. Townsend answered questions posed to him by corporate counsel and 
prepared a report which he submitted to the Corporation. Mr. Townsend concluded that it 
was not in the best interest of the Corporation to proceed with the derivative action in this 
case. This was based on a number of factors. Mr. Townsend lists 9 factors he considered 
in reaching his conclusion: (1) the airport venture, as structured has been profitable; (2) 
the profitability has been twofold: both as a return on capital and as increased sales and 
revenues for the Corporation with Airport as a new customer; (3) there is no evidence that 
Dana Brewster actually had $100,000.00 cash or was prepared to invest this amount in the 
summer of 2006; (4) the structure of Airport (i.e. the use of a separate LLC for the new 
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airport retail operations) is a sound business strategy in keeping with Roasters' historical 
business practices; (5) Steven Brewster used reasonable business judgment in the way he 
structured Airport; (6) the cost of litigation verses a potential damage award in the case 
weighs against maintaining the case. Roasters' recovery would need to exceed the cost of 
acquiring the other 50% of Airport with borrowed funds, plus financing costs, plus 
litigation costs; (7) Roasters' best case recovery is limited to the excess of the value of the 
Airport opportunity in 2006 which exceeds the cost of borrowing the money in 2006, 
which is unlikely to be so significant as to justify the cost and distraction of litigation; (8) 
any financing Roasters could have obtained in 2006 would have required the personal 
guarantee of its principals, namely Steven and Dana Brewster, and the Corporation could 
not force its owners to sign personal guarantees (In other words, the Roasters could not 
have financed the additional $100,000.00 on its own); and (9) the current ownership 
percentages in Airport are consistent with the investments made and the assumptions of 
risk taken by Steven Brewster and the Corporation at the time. The Corporation owns an 
interest commensurate with its own investment and risk. (Rec. 1054-1056, f^s 1-9) 
After his report of July 7, 2008, Dana provided additional information to 
Mr. Townsend regarding her ability to personally come up with the $100,000.00 needed 
in the summer of 2006. (Rec. 1024, f^s 5-7). Mr. Townsend prepared an Affidavit 
addressing this information, stating that even if Dana had access to $100,000.00 to invest 
in the summer of 2006, it would not change his conclusion. (Rec. 1025, f 7). 
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On October 7, 2008, the Corporation filed its Motion to Dismiss the 
Derivative Action pursuant to §16-10a-740(4)(a), based on the report and conclusion of 
Mr. Townsend that it was not in the best interest of the Corporation to maintain the 
derivative action in this case. The Motion was accompanied with a Memorandum in 
Support, with Mr. Townsend's report attached, and an Affidavit of Mr. Townsend (Rec. 
1023-1070). A Memorandum in Opposition was filed by Dana on December 2, 2008 
(Rec. 1186-1209); and a Reply Memorandum was filed on December 22, 2008. (Rec. 
1358-1369). Oral argument was held on the Motion to Dismiss on February 9, 2009. 
(Rec. 1376). The trial court continued the matter requesting that Mr. Townsend appear 
for an evidentiary hearing to testify about the opinion in his report, his affidavit and 
deposition. (Rec. 1384) The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing on March 30, 2009. 
At the March 30, 2009 hearing Mr. Townsend appeared and testified 
regarding his report, his affidavit and deposition; and his conclusion that it was not in the 
best interest of the Corporation to proceed with the derivative claims. (Rec. 1565/Trans 
3/30/09 pgs. 24 & 61) At the end of the hearing the court found that there was no bias on 
the part of Mr. Townsend and that he had conducted his investigation in good faith. (Rec. 
1565/Trans. 3/30/09 pg. 98). However, the court in hind-sight questioned whether the 
Corporation had done all it possibly could do, to fund the full $200,000.00 for the airport 
project. (Rec. 1565/Trans. 3/30/09 pg. 69) The court specifically asked questions 
regarding the possibility of the Corporation factoring its accounts receivables in 2006 in 
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order to raise enough money to pay the full $200,000.00 needed. (Rec. 1565/Trans. pgs. 
57-58). The court, thus denied, the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss the Derivative 
Action. (Rec. 1565/Trans. pg. 98). 
In response to the court's questions Steven Brewster submitted a Second 
Declaration to Dismiss the Derivative Claims, stating why factoring the accounts 
receivables was not a sound business option to fund the airport venture. (Rec. 1464-1466, 
Tf 4-8) Mr. Townsend also submitted a Second Affidavit addressing the court's questions, 
indicating that even if the Corporation would have factored its accounts receivables, it 
would not have had enough money to fund the full $200,000.00 needed. (Rec. 1420-1425, 
f 8) Mr. Townsend's conclusion remained the same, that the derivative action should be 
dismissed. (Rec. 1424,19). 
The trial court did not change its position; and signed its Order denying 
Millcreek Coffee Roasters' Motion to Dismiss the Derivative Claims on April 16, 2009. 
(Rec. 1505-1507). There was no evidence or argument to challenge Mr. Townsend's 
good faith. (Rec. 1506, f 1). However, the court questioned whether the Corporation did 
all that it could do to obtain the $200,000.00 to fully fund the project in the summer of 
2006; therefore, the court denied the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. 1506, ^ f 2). 
On May 5, 2009, the Defendants filed Defendants' Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal Pursuant to §16-10a-740(4)(g). On May 27, 2009, the matter was transferred to 
the Utah Court of Appeals; and on June 5, 2009, the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was 
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granted by the Utah Court of Appeals. (Rec. 1557). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Millcreek Coffee Roasters, is in the business of wholesale coffee, 
imports, roasting and sales. Its main location is 657 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Dana Brewster, D. Steven Brewster, and their 3 children (Steven, Stacey & Tiffany) 
are all shareholders in the Corporation.2 Dana Brewster ("Dana") and D. Steven Brewster 
("Steven") divorced in 1996, and D. Steven Brewster has been managing the Corporation 
since this time. (Rec. 98, f$ 9 & 10; Rec. 1187-1188). 
2. Dana Brewster in her suit, claims that the Brewster Defendants 
misappropriated a corporate opportunity, in not having the Corporation fully fund 
$200,000.00, which was needed in the summer of 2006, in order to take advantage of the 
unique retail opportunity at the Salt Lake International Airport. (Rec. 549-550, 1191). 
3. In late 2005 and early 2006, during a very short window of time, an 
opportunity became available to open a retail outlet at the Salt Lake International Airport. 
To take advantage of this opportunity an investment of $200,000.00 was necessary to 
fund the project. Timing was of the essence, as the opportunity would be lost, if no action 
was promptly taken. (Rec. 1033; 1073, ^  9). 
4. Steven informed Dana of this opportunity and each initially agreed to 
2On January 1, 2006 each child received 2% for a total of 6%, the remaining 94% is 
shared by Dana and D. Steven Brewster, each with 47%. 
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invest half ($100,000.00 each) to fund the airport project. This is undisputed. (Rec. 1191). 
The project would be funded through a separate entity, Millcreek Coffee Airport LLC. 
This is commonly how the Corporation took on new projects. This would protect the 
Corporation from the high amount of risk associated with the airport venture (Delta's fate 
at the airport was uncertain at the time); and would also prevent the Corporation from 
having to go into debt, which would have to be serviced, thereby greatly reducing profits 
available for the shareholders. This business approach was consistent with the way the 
Corporation operated in the past, which allowed the Corporation to provide a high amount 
in dividends, as requested by the shareholders.3 (Rec. 1073) 
5. Steven invested his $100,000.00 to start the project, but Dana, 
contrary to her promises, did not invest the other $100,000.00, when the money was 
needed. This fact is undisputed. (Rec. 1191). As a result, Steven had to use the 
Corporation's cash reserves (accumulated over a ten year period) to pay the remaining 
$100,000.00 to complete the project, and the Corporation became a 50% owner in the 
airport project. (Rec. 1073, f 13; Rec. 1191). 
6. Dana does not dispute that the airport project has been a profitable 
investment; but she asserts that rather than investing the cash reserves of $100,000.00, 
3Taking money from the Corporation to fund the airport project, would result in a 
decrease of distributions; and Dana informed Steven that decreasing the amount of 
distributions would be unacceptable. (Rec. 1565/Trans. 3/30/09 pg.31, lines 24-25 & pg. 
32, lines 2-3). 
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(which Steven was forced to use when Dana didn't pay her $100,000.00) the Corporation 
should have obtained and paid the full $200,000.00 to fund the project. This would make 
the Corporation the sole owner of the airport project, in effect taking away Steven's 
$100,000.00 investment and doubling her interest. (Rec. 541, % 43; Rec. 553, ^  130). 
7. Dana asserts in hind-sight that the Corporation should have paid the 
full $200,000.00, although it was not financially feasible at the time; and a loan to the 
Corporation would have required the Corporation to go into debt, and servicing the debt, 
would have greatly reduced the high return on dividends that Dana had requested as a 
shareholder. A loan to the Corporation would have also required the personal guarantees 
of both Dana and Steven, as principals, which they did not want to sign, nor could the 
Corporation force them to sign. (Rec. 1055, | 8). 
8. Steven in funding the airport venture through a separate business 
entity, to protect the Corporation from the high amount of risk associated with the airport 
venture; to prevent the Corporation from incurring a great amount of debt to service; and 
to protect Steven and Dana from signing personal guarantees; at all times operated under 
sound business judgment. (Rec. 1055, ^ Js 4-5, 8). 
9. The Corporation, was appointed independent counsel, Margaret H. 
Olson, of Hobbs & Olson, L.C., who was approved by the court. (Rec. 962-964). 
10. As counsel for the Corporation, Margaret H. Olson retained a 
forensic accountant, R. Brad Townsend, 1o conduct an independent inquiry under Utah 
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Statute, § 16-10a-740 U.C.A., to determine if the maintenance of the derivative action in 
this case, was in the best interest of the Corporation. (Rec. 1034, f s 14 & 15). 
11. Dana and Steven, and the other Brewster Defendants, stipulated to, 
and waived any objections to, the appointment of Mr. Townsend as the "specified person" 
to conduct the inquiry under § 16-10a-740. (Rec. 1034, ^ 15; Rec. 1045; Rec. 1024, f 3) 
This is undisputed by Dana. (Rec. 1191). 
12. The Corporation, based on Mr. Townsend's report, filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the Derivative Action pursuant to Utah Statute § 16-10a-740. (Rec. 1069). The 
Motion included a Memorandum in Support, with the July 7, 2008 report of Mr. 
Townsend attached (Rec. 1031-1068) along with the Affidavit of R. Brad Townsend. 
(Rec. 1023-1025). 
13. Mr. Townsend conduced an in-depth analysis as to whether the 
maintenance of the derivative proceeding was in the best interest of the Corporation. 
(Rec. 1023-1068). To do this, he analyzed all the books and records of the Corporation, 
including documents provided by both parties, as well as, documents he specifically 
requested. A log of the documents he reviewed was provided as an attachment to his 
report. (Rec. 1065). 
14. Mr. Townsend over the past 21 years as a forensic accountant, has 
spent thousands of hours in the analysis of closely-held corporations including the 
analysis of their financial information and business practices. (Rec. 1023, U 2). His 
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curriculum vitae was provided as Attachment 2 to his report. (Rec. 1067-1068). 
15. During the course of his investigation, Mr. Townsend interviewed 
D. Steven Brewster, Dana Brewster, her legal counsel, and representatives of Bank of the 
West. The professional staff of Mr. Townsend spent approximately 80 hours interviewing 
witnesses, analyzing documents, and researching information in preparing the report. 
(Rec. 1024 & 1048). 
16. Mr. Townsend answered questions posed to him by corporate 
counsel in his report, which was submitted to counsel and subsequently to the court in 
support of the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss the Derivative Claims. (Rec. 1047-1068). 
In his report Mr. Townsend indicates that the structure employed by Mr. Brewster of 
retaining the Corporation as the core business essentially debt-free and developing other 
business opportunities through separate entities is consistent with the structure historically 
employed by the Corporation and is commonly employed in the business community. 
(Rec. 1054-1055, fs 4-5). Mr. Townsend further opines that Mr. Brewster in structuring 
the airport opportunity the way he did, at all times used sound business judgment. (Rec. 
1054-1055, Tfs 4-5). 
17. Mr. Townsend searched for any misappropriated funds, but found 
none. His analysis further included an actual cash flow and a hypothetical debt 
repayment plan. He further verified that the Corporation did not have $200,000.00 on 
hand to fund the project; and for the Corporation to borrow the $200,000.00 necessary to 
16 
fully fund the project, the personal guarantees of the owners would be required; which the 
Corporation could not force them to sign. (Rec. 1055, Tf 5). 
18. The financial inability of the Corporation, at the time, to fully fund 
the $200,000.00 and Mr. Brewster's use of sound business judgment in his actions, are 
not the only factors Mr. Townsend considered in reaching his conclusion. Mr. Townsend 
lists nine (9) factors he considered in reaching his conclusion, including: (1) the airport 
venture, as structured has been profitable; (2) the profitability has been twofold: both as a 
return on capital and as increased sales and revenues for the Corporation with Airport as a 
new customer; (3) there is no evidence that Dana Brewster actually had $100,000.00 cash 
or was prepared to invest this amount in the summer of 2004; (4) the structure of Airport 
(i.e. the use of a separate LLC for the new airport retail operations) is a sound business 
strategy in keeping with Roasters' historical business practices; (5) Steven Brewster used 
reasonable business judgment in the way he structured Airport; (6) the cost of litigation 
verses a potential damage award in the case weighs against maintaining the case. 
Roasters' recovery would need to exceed the cost of acquiring the other 50% of Airport 
with borrowed funds, plus financing costs, plus litigation costs; (7) Roasters' best case 
recovery is limited to the excess of the value of the Airport opportunity in 2006 which 
exceeds the cost of borrowing the money in 2006, which is unlikely to be so significant as 
to justify the cost and distraction of litigation; (8) any financing Roasters could have 
obtained in 2006 would have required the personal guarantee of its principals, namely 
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Steven and Dana Brewster, and the Corporation could not force its owners to sign 
personal guarantees (In other words, the Roasters could not have financed the additional 
$100,000.00 on its own); and (9) the current ownership percentages in Airport are 
consistent with the investments made and the assumptions of risk taken by Steven 
Brewster and the Corporation. The Corporation owns an interest commensurate with its 
own investment and risk. (Rec. 1054-1056, f^s 1-9). 
19. After his July 7, 2008 report, Dana Brewster provided additional 
information to Mr. Townsend, regarding her ability to personally come up with the 
$100,000.00 in the summer of 2006. (Rec. 1024-1025, | s 5-6) Mr. Townsend prepared an 
Affidavit addressing this information stating that even if Dana Brewster had access to 
$100,000 in 2006 to invest, it would not change his conclusion, that the Corporation did 
not have the ability to independently fund the project, that Mr. Brewster acted under 
sound business judgment, and that the maintenance of the derivative action is unduly 
costly and draining on corporate resources relative to the value of the alleged loss; and 
thus, it was still his conclusion that the derivative action be dismissed in the best interest 
of the Corporation. (Rec. 1025-1026). 
20. A hearing was held on the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss on 
February 9, 2009. After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court continued the 
matter and set if for an evidentiary hearing, requesting that Mr. Townsend appear and 
testify about the opinions in his report, affidavit and deposition. (Rec. 1384) 
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21. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 30, 2009. Mr. Townsend 
appeared and testified regarding his report, his affidavit, and the conclusion he had 
reached, i.e., that based on his investigation, it was not in the best interest of the 
Corporation to proceed with the derivative action in this case. (Rec. 1565/Trans. 3/30/09 
pg. 24). It was still Mr. Townsend's conclusion at the end of his testimony that it was in 
the best interest of the Corporation that the derivative claims be dismissed. (Rec. 1565/ 
Trans. 3/30/09 pg. 61). 
22. At the end of the hearing the court found that there was no bias on 
the part of Mr. Townsend and that he had conducted his investigation in good faith. (Rec. 
1565/Trans. 3/30/09 pg. 98 ; Rec. 1506,^ 1). However, the court in hind-sight, after 
questioning whether the Corporation did all it could possibly do, to fund the full $200,000 
for the airport project, denied the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss the Derivative Action. 
(Rec. 1565/Trans. 3/30/09 pgs. 69 & 98; Rec. 1506, Tf 2). 
23. The trial court specifically asked questions regarding the possibility 
of the Corporation factoring its accounts receivables in 2006 in order to raise enough 
money to pay the full $200,000.00 needed for the airport project. (Rec. 1565/Trans. 
3/30/09 pgs. 57-58, 69-70, & 98). 
24. In response D. Steven Brewster submitted a Second Declaration to 
Dismiss the Derivative Claims, stating why factoring the accounts receivables of the 
Corporation was not a sound business decision to fund the airport venture. (Rec. 1464-
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1466). 
25. Mr. Townsend also submitted a Second Affidavit, addressing the 
court's questions, indicating that even if the Corporation would have factored its 
receivables, it would not have had enough money to fund the full $200,000.00 needed for 
the airport project. Mr. Townsend's conclusion remained the same, that Steven Brewster 
acted with sound business judgment in funding the airport project, and that the derivative 
action should be dismissed. (Rec. 1420-1486). 
26. The trial court did not change its position, but signed its Order 
denying the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss the Derivative Claims on April 16, 2009. 
(Rec. 1505-1507). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties stipulated to use Mr. Townsend as the specified person to 
conduct the inquiry under § 16-10a-740(4)(a) and determine whether or not it is in the 
best interest of the Corporation to proceed with the derivative claims in this case. (Rec. 
1191) Mr. Townsend, a forensic accountant with 21 years of experience, conducted an 
in-depth investigation to make this determination, including the examination the 
Corporation's books and records, and documentation provided by both parties, as well as, 
documents he specifically requested. He searched for any misappropriation of funds. His 
analysis included actual cash flow and a hypothetical debt repayment plan. He conducted 
interviews of both the parties, Dana's legal counsel, and bank representatives. 
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After an extensive investigation of approximately 80 man hours, Mr. 
Townsend concluded that Steven Brewster acted within sound business principles in 
structuring and funding the airport venture, and that it was not in the best interest of the 
Corporation to proceed with the derivative claims in this case. Not only this, but Mr. 
Townsend cited nine (9) specific factors he considered in reaching his conclusion. (Rec. 
1054-1056, | s 1-9). 
The Corporation filed its Motion to Dismiss the Derivative Claims under § 
16-10a-740(4)(a) based on the conclusion reached by Mr. Townsend. §16-10a-740(4)(a) 
provides that "[a] derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the 
corporation if a person or group specified under Subsections 4(b) or 4(f) determines in 
good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based, 
that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the 
corporation."(emphasis added) §16-10a-740(4)(a). 
There was no question but that the inquiry was done in good faith; however, 
the trial court denied the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss, questioning whether the 
Corporation did all it could do to obtain the $200,000.00 necessary to fully fund the 
airport project during the summer of 2006. This questioning and de novo review by the 
trial court of Mr. Townsend's inquiry and conclusions, is contrary to the mandate "shall" 
in the Statute and goes beyond the court's role, as set forth in §16-10a-740(4)(a). 
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The court's review of a corporation's decision not to proceed with such 
derivative claims was set forth in Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y.I 979). In 
Auerbach the court recognized that, "courts are ill-equipped to evaluate business 
judgments while corporate directors (are) peculiarly qualified to discharge that 
responsibility." Therefore, "what has been uncovered and the relative weight accorded in 
evaluating and balancing the several factors and considerations are beyond the scope of 
judicial concern." Id. at 1003. 
The trial court in this case, by exploring all the alternative means of 
financing that may have been available for the Corporation, in the summer of 2006, to 
obtain the $200,000.00 necessary to fully fund the airport project, whether by loans, 
personal guarantees, or the factoring of accountant receivables, goes beyond the court's 
role of review under §16-10a-740(4)(a). Auerbach 47 N.Y.2d at 634. 
The trial court knowing that a good faith and reasonable inquiry was made 
into these matters by the person specified by the parties under § 16-10a-740 (4)(a), should 
not evaluate or weigh the factors considered in order to substitute its own business 
judgment for that of the person so designated under the Statute. 
Furthermore, Mr. Townsend found that the Defendants acted within sound 
business principles, within the business judgment rule. Under the business judgment rule 
a derivative suit cannot be maintained on the corporation's behalf if the directors acted 
with sound business judgment in their decisions. Therefore, even if it was determined by 
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hind-sight, that alternative financing was available to the Corporation to raise this money 
(which it was not), this fact would still be insufficient to overcome the business judgment 
rule; and the Corporation with this conclusion of Mr. Townsend, is entitled to have the 
derivative claims dismissed under § 16-10a-740(4)(a). 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT FOR THE DECISION MADE BY 
THE PERSON SPECIFIED UNDER § 16-10a-740(4)(f) U.C.A. 
WHO CONCLUDES THAT IT IS NOT IN THE BEST 
INTEREST OF THE COMPANY TO MAINTAIN THE 
DERIVATIVE PROCEEDING 
There is no question but that the inquiry was performed in good faith (Rec. 
1565/Trans. 3/30/09 pg. 98); and the parties agreed to use Mr. Townsend to conduct the 
inquiry under §16-10a-740(4)(a). (Rec. 1191). 
The trial court, in considering the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss under 
§ 16-10a-740(4)(a); questioned Mr. Townsend about whether or not the Corporation 
could have obtained alternative financing for the airport project through factoring its 
accounts receivable. (Rec. 1656/Trans. 3/30/09 pg. 57-58, 69) The trial court denied the 
Motion to Dismiss concluding that maybe the Corporation could have fully financed the 
airport project and perhaps the Corporation didn't do all that it could have done, to obtain 
the $200,000.00 needed to fully fund the project. (Rec. 1506, f 2). 
This questioning and de novo review by the trial court of Mr. Townsend's 
conclusions goes beyond the court's role, as set forth in § 16-10a-740(4)(a). §16-10a-740 
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(4)(a) provides that a derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court, (emphasis 
added). The meaning of the word "shall" in a statute is ordinarily that of a command with 
no discretion left to the trial court. Brendle v. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1047 
(UtApp. 1997); A.E. v. Christean, 938 P.2d 811, 815 (Ut.App. 1997). §16-10a-740(4)(a) 
provides that the court shall dismiss the derivative proceeding after a determination has 
been made that it is not in the best interests of the corporation to proceed, not by the 
court, but the person specified under the Statute. §16-10a-740(4)(a). 
Thus, according to the Statute, this determination is not to be made by the 
court, but by the person specified to conduct the inquiry under the Statute. If the decision 
was to be made by the court, there would be no reason to enact the Statute, and the Statute 
would be rendered meaningless. Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 89 P.3d 113 (Utah 
2004) (Statutes are to be interpreted in such a manner as to give meaning to all their 
parts). In enacting this Statute, the legislature recognized, similar to the court in 
Auerbach, that, "courts are ill-equipped to evaluate business judgments" while corporate 
directors, and others in the business field, are much better qualified to make such 
decisions.4/d. at 1003. Cf. Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F.Supp.120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("we 
are precluded from substituting our uninformed opinion for that of experienced business 
managers of a corporation who have no personal interest in the outcome"). 
4For example, factoring the accounts receivables, as suggested by the court, not 
only would have not have raised the money necessary to fully fund the project; but would 
have been a bad business decision. (Rec. 1464-1466, % 4-8; Rec. 1420-1425, ^ 8). 
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Furthermore, if it was intended for the trial court have such discretion to 
make this determination, or to conduct a de novo review of the designated person's 
reasoning and conclusions; the legislature could have clearly provided so in the Statute. 
In stead, the legislature chose to instruct the court that it "shall" dismiss the action, using 
a word recognized as a command with no discretion for the trial court. Brendle v. City of 
Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Ut.App. 1997). 
The court, in this case, cannot disregard the word "shall" in the Statute; and 
cannot disregard the conclusion reached by the person specified under the Statute, by 
substituting its own business judgment, and refusing to dismiss the derivative proceeding 
under§16-10a-740(4)(a). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REVIEW UNDER § 16-10a-740(4)(a) 
IS LIMITED TO WHETHER A REASONABLE AND GOOD 
FAITH INQUIRY HAS BEEN MADE; NOT TO EVALUATE OR 
WEIGH THE FACTORS CONSIDERED. 
There is a difference between determining whether a reasonable inquiry has 
been conducted and whether the court agrees with the business judgment and conclusions 
reached by the person specified under the Statute. In considering whether a reasonable 
inquiry was made, the trial court may consider the following factors: (1) the length and 
scope of the investigation, (2) the use of independent counsel or experts, (3) the 
corporation's or the defendants' involvement, if any, in the investigation, and (4) the 
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adequacy and reliability of the information supplied for the investigation.5 Drilling v. 
Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999). 
In determining if a reasonable inquiry has been made, the court is not to 
weigh or re-evaluate the factors considered in the investigation. In Re UnitedHealth 
Group Inc. Shareholer, 591 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1030 (D.Minn 2008); citing Drilling v. 
Berman 589 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999). The question is whether the 
investigation was so restrictive in scope, so shallow in execution, or otherwise so pro 
forma, or half-hearted; that it constitutes a pretext, or a sham. 19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations 
§ 1975; In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 801 A.2d 295 (NJ. 2002); In re United 
Health Group Inc. Shareholder, supra, at 1029 (D.Minn 2008), quoting Auerbach 47 
N.Y.2d. at 634-35, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d at 1003. 
Under Auerbach, the Corporation need only show "that the areas and 
subjects to be examined are reasonably complete and that there has been a good faith 
pursuit of inquiry into such areas and subjects. What has been uncovered and the relative 
weight accorded in evaluating and balancing the several factors and considerations, are 
beyond the scope of judicial concern" (emphasis added) In Re United Health Group Inc. 
Shareholer, supra at 1030; citing Drilling v. Berman 589 N. W.2d 503, 508 (Minn.Ct. 
App. 1999) quoting Auerbach Al N.Y.2d at 634. Furthermore "Any information 
5The trial court did not make any finding that any of these factors were lacking or 
were inadequate, in its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. 1506, % 2). 
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regarding the committee's reasoning is not relevant to [the Court's] review "(emphasis 
added) Id. at 1030, citing Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 510-11. 
According to the report of Mr. Townsend, he and his staff conducted an in-
depth inquiry into the matter, analyzing numerous documents and financial statements, 
interviewing Steven Brewster and Dana Brewster, legal counsel for the parties, and 
representatives from Bank of the West. Mr. Townsend searched for any misappropriation 
of funds and prepared a hypothetical debt repayment plan from actual cash flow. Mr. 
Townsend and his staff spent approximately 80 hours in analyzing the documents, 
researching, and reviewing the information provided in preparation of his report Mr. 
Townsend covered the areas of concern, the structuring and financing of the airport 
opportunity. His report was not a sham, or a pretext, and the court did not find it to be so. 
The trial court in exploring what alternative means of financing may have 
been available for the Corporation in the summer of 2006, to obtain the $200,000.00 
needed to fully fund the project, whether by loans, personal guarantees, or the factoring of 
accountant receivables,6 and weighing the options available; and evaluating the reasons 
given for Mr. Townsend's conclusions, goes beyond the court's scope of review under § 
16-10a-740(4)(a). Auerbach 47 N.Y.2d. at 634-35. 
6According to Mr. Townsend factoring the accountants receivables to fund a new 
business venture is not a sound business decision; and even with factoring the accountants 
receivables, the Corporation still would not have been able to fund the full $200,000.00. 
(Rec. 1422-1424). 
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The trial court knowing that a good faith and reasonable inquiry was made 
into these matters by the person specified by the parties under § 16-10a-740 (4)(a), should 
not re-evaluate or weigh the factors considered and substitute its own business judgment 
for that of Mr. Townsend. In Re United Health Group Inc. Shareholder, supra at 1030, 
citing Drilling v. Berman 589 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999). 
The trial court erred in denying the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss under 
§16-10a-740(4)(a), after weighing the factors considered and re-evaluating the reasons 
given, to make its own business judgment as to whether or not it is in the best interest of 
the Corporation to proceed with the derivative claims. In Re UnitedHealth Group Inc. 
Shareholer, supra at 1030. The Statute clearly provides that this is the role of the person 
designated under the Statute and not for the courts to decide. 
III. AFTER THE PERSON SPECIFIED UNDER § 16-10a-740(4)(f) 
FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANTS USED SOUND BUSINESS 
JUDGMENT, THE COURT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF ITS 
REVIEW UNDER § 16-10a-740(4)(a) BY DENYING THE 
CORPORATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Mr. Townsend further found, that in structuring and financing the airport 
project, Steven Brewster operated within sound business principles; and thus, within the 
business judgment rule. Therefore, the Brewster Defendants are further protected from 
the derivative claims by the business judgment rule. This was one of the specific factors 
relied upon by Mr. Townsend in his report and conclusion. (Rec. 1054-1055) 
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Under the "business judgment rule" a shareholder cannot maintain a 
derivative suit on the corporation's behalf by merely showing that the corporation's 
refusal to act was unwise, inexpedient, negligent or imprudent, if the director acted with 
sound business judgment at the time. C & YCorp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 
47, 55 (Ut.App. 1995). Therefore, even if alternative financing was available to the 
Corporation at the time, this would be insufficient to overcome the business judgment 
rule, and the Brewster Defendants would not be liable on the derivative claims. The 
Corporation believing this (especially after such a determination has been independently 
made by Mr. Townsend), should be entitled under the business judgment rule, to have the 
derivative claims dismissed under § 16-10a-740(4)(a). 
To overcome the business judgment rule a shareholder must challenge the 
good faith or reasonableness of the investigation made. Again, there is no challenge to 
the good faith of Mr. Townsend and the question as to whether the inquiry was 
reasonable, is whether the investigation has been so restrictive in scope, so shallow in 
execution, or otherwise so pro forma or half-hearted, as to constitute a pretext or a 
sham. 19 Am Jur 2d, Corporations § 1975; In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 801 
A.2d 295 (NJ. 2002); In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. Shareholder, 591 F.Supp.2d 1023, 
1029 (D.Minn 2008), quoting Auerbach 47 N.Y.2& at 634-35, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 
N.E.2datl003. 
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The investigation in this case was not so restrictive, or shallow in scope, as 
to constitute a pretext, or a sham. Mr. Townsend not only reviewed the structuring and 
financing of the airport opportunity, but found that Mr. Brewster, by financing it as he 
did, operated under sound business principles, common in the practice. 
The trial court erred in denying the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss under 
§16-10a-740(4)(a), after Mr. Townsend in his report found that the Brewster Defendants 
operated under sound business principles, and within the business judgment rule; and thus 
it is not in the best interest of the Corporation to proceed with the derivative claims. 
The Corporation should not be required to proceed with the derivative 
claims and incur the continuing aggravation and expense of litigation, draining the 
Corporation's financial resources, when it has been determined that the actions taken by 
Steven Brewster, in structuring and financing the airport project, were reasonable and 
protected under the business judgment rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The Corporation, following Utah Statute § 16-10a-740, in regards to 
Procedures in Derivative Proceedings, retained an independent person Mr. Townsend, to 
whom the parties agreed, to conduct an investigation under the Statute. Mr. Townsend 
after an extensive investigation and in-depth analysis of the relevant financial statements, 
and other documents provided, searching for any misappropriations, preparing actual cash 
flow and debt repayment plans, conducting interviews with the parties, with legal counsel, 
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and bank representatives, and spending more than 80 man-hours in preparing his report; 
found that the Brewster Defendants acted under sound business principles, and within the 
business judgment rule, in structuring the airport opportunity and financing the project. 
Mr. Townsend concluded in his report, citing nine (9) specific factors (including the 
business judgment rule); that it was not in the best interest of the Corporation to proceed 
with the derivative claims. 
Based on his conclusion the Corporation filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
Derivative Claims, pursuant to § 16-10a-740(4)(a), which provides that the court shall 
dismiss the derivative claims on motion by the corporation after a good faith and 
reasonable inquiry has been made. 
The trial court improperly denied the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss in 
this case, by disregarding the language in the Statute that it "shall" dismiss; and by 
improperly weighing the factors considered, and re-evaluating the reasons given by Mr. 
Townsend in reaching his conclusion. 
Furthermore, Mr. Townsend found that the Brewster Defendants followed 
sound business principles in their actions and decisions; and thus, would be protected 
from the derivative claims under the business judgment rule. 
The ruling of the trial court denying the Corporation's Motion to Dismiss 
the Derivative Claims, should therefore, be reversed. The Corporation's Motion to 
Dismiss pursuant to § 16-10a-740(4)(a), based on the good faith inquiry and conclusions 
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of Mr. Townsend, should be granted. 
DATED this _ £ _ day of October, 2009. 




Budge W. Call, 
Attorneys for Brewster Defendants 
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FILED DISTRICT C0UR1 
Third Judicial District 
F. Kevin Bond (5039) 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
BOND & CALL L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 720 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-8900 
Attorneys for Defendants, D. Steven Brewster, 
Gary Brewster, Millcreek Coffee Airport LLC 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
COUNTY OF SAL!1 LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DANA BREWSTER, in her individual ; 
capacity and on behalf of all other 
shareholders of Millcreek Roasters Corp. ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
D. STEVEN BREWSTER, an individual, 
GARY B. BREWSTER, an individual, ; 
MILLCREEK COFFEE ROASTERS 
CORP., a Utah corporation, and ) 
MILLCREEK COFFEE AIRPORT 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company, ) 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER ON MILLCREEK COFFEE 
ROASTERS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
) THE DERIVATIVE CLAIMS and 
BREWSTER'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
) DANA'S INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS 
1 Civil No. 060917535 
Judge: John Paul Kennedy 
Millcreek Coffee Roasters Corp. ("Roasters") Motion to Dismiss the Derivative 
Claims pursuant to § 16-10a-740(4)(a), and the Defenants, D. Steven Brewster, Gary B. 
Brewster, and Millcreek Coffee Airport, LLC ("Brewsters") Motion to Dismiss Dana's 
Individual Claims for failure to state a claim, came on for hearing and testimony before the Court 
on March 30, 2009. 




The Plaintiff, Dana Brewster, was present at the hearing and was represented by 
counsel, Gerry B. Holman; the Defendant, D. Steven Brewster, was present at the hearing and 
was represented by counsel, Budge W. Call; the Defendant, Millcreek Coffee Roasters Corp., 
was represented at the hearing by counsel, Margaret H. Olson. 
R. Brad Townsend, the person the parties stipulated to, to perform the inquiry 
under § 16-10a-740, as to whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding in this case is in 
the best interest of Roasters' Corp., was also present at the hearing and gave testimony regarding 
his inquiry and conclusion, that it was not in the best interest of the Corporation to proceed with 
the derivative claims in this case. 
The Court, having considered the testimony of R. Brad Townsend, the report of 
Mr. Townsend, the pleadings and memoranda filed, as well as, the argument of counsel; 
HEREBY ORDERS AND DECREES, as follows: 
1. The inquiry performed by R. Brad Townsend was conducted in good faith, there 
was no evidence or argument presented to challenge Mr. Townsend's good faith. 
2. The Court has questions concerning the reasonableness of Mr. Townsend's 
inquiry, as to whether the Corporation did all it could to fund the Airport project; therefore, the 
Corporation's Motion to Dismiss the Derivative Proceeding is denied at this time. 
3. Brewster's Motion to Dismiss the Individual Claims is well-taken. At the hearing 
Plaintiff indicated that she is no longer proceeding on a number of the claims, some of the claims 
have already been withdrawn, and some of the relief sought in the claims cannot be granted by 
the Court. The Amended Complaint also fails to name all of the shareholders in the Corporation, 
which is one of the elements necessary to bring an individual claim as a shareholder. 
4. The Plaintiff shall have 10 days from March 30, 2009, to file an Amended 
Complaint to remove the claims she has withdrawn, to remove those she is no longer pursuing, 
and to include all of the shareholders of the Corporation. 
5. After Plaintiff files her Amended Complaint, the Defendants may renew their 
Motion to Dismiss. If the Amended Complaint does not contain all of the shareholders, the 
Court will dismiss the individual claims for failure to comply with this necessary requirement. 
SO ORDERED, this (h day of 
Approved as to form: 
Gerry B. Holman 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Margaret H. Olson 
Attorney for Roasters Corp. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ day of April, 2009,1 did mail, U.S. First Class, 
postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MILLCREEK 
COFFEE ROASTERS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE DERIVATIVE CLAIMS and 
BREWSTER'S MOTION TO DISMISS DANA'S INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS, to the 
following: 
Gerry B. Holman 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Margaret H. Olson 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
466 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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